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1STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
102(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue #1:  Did the trial court abuse its discretion in excluding the proposed nursing
module exhibits?
Standard of Review:  A trial court's ruling on admissibility of evidence is upheld where
there is any valid basis to do so, Whitehead v. Am. Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 927 (Utah
1990), and it is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28, ¶
10, 94 P.3d 193.  
Issue #2:  Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting references by both parties
to collateral sources of benefits? 
Standard of Review:  The trial court's rulings on this issue are reviewed for abuse of
discretion.  See Standard of Review for Issue No. 1.
Issue #3:  Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting testimony by Jared
Wilson's treating physicians?     
Standard of Review:  The trial court's rulings on this issue are reviewed for abuse of
discretion.  See Standard of Review for Issue No. 1.
Issue #4:  Did the trial court abuse its discretion in excluding part of Dr. Hyde's
proposed expert testimony as irrelevant and unreliable?
1Though not listed in the Wilsons' Statement of Issues (Wilsons' Br. pp. 1-2), the Wilsons'
Brief presents an argument that the trial court erred in awarding the Hospital costs on the
grounds that the Hospital's Bill of Costs was untimely.  (Wilsons' Br. p. 46).  "A court's award
of costs . . . will not [be] disturb[ed] absent an abuse of discretion."  Walker v. Hansen, 2003 UT
App 237, ¶ 14, 74 P.3d 635.  The question of whether the Hospital's application for costs was
timely is a legal question, which is reviewed for correctness.  Madsen v. Wash. Mut. Bank FSB,
2008 UT 69, ¶ 19, 199 P.3d 898.    
2
Standard of Review:  Exclusion of expert testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion
in which the trial court is allowed "considerable latitude," and will not be reversed unless the
ruling "exceeds the limits of reasonability."  Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 347 (Utah 1996);
State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, ¶ 66, 44 P.3d 794.
Issue #5:  Whether a new trial is required under the cumulative error doctrine?
Standard of Review:  A new trial is not warranted under the cumulative error doctrine
unless "the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines [this Court's] confidence . . . that
a fair trial was held."  Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Air Quality Bd., 2009 UT 76, ¶ 54, 644 Utah
Adv. Rep. 27.
Issue #6:  Did the trial court correctly award costs only against Jared Wilson, as opposed
to his parents, and should the costs for trial transcripts used on appeal now be awarded?
Standard of Review:  Whether costs may be taxed against parents who have initiated
lawsuits on behalf of their minor children is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Madsen
v. Wash. Mut. Bank FSB, 2008 UT 69, ¶ 19, 199 P.3d 898.1  Costs may be awarded for trial
transcripts used on appeal.  Utah R. App. P. 34(c).    
Preservation:  The issue of whether costs should be awarded against Jared's parents was
briefed and ruled upon below.  (R. 8452-8458, Ruling Re: Def. IHC's M. for Costs; R. 8499-
8501, Ruling Re: Pl.'s Obj. to Prop. Order Re: Costs and Req. for Clarification; R. 8502-8505,
2R. 7121 is the trial court's final exhibit list.  All trial exhibits referenced herein are
contained in Part I of the Hospital's Addendum.  The medical records were stipulated and
3
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part UVRMC's Verified Mem. of Costs; R. 8594-8598,
Ruling Re: Pl.'s Objection to Order and Req. for Clarification.)
Issue #7:  Did the trial court err in allowing discovery and admission of the Hospital's
privileged neonatal morbidity and mortality statistics?
Standard of Review:  Whether the neonatal morbidity and mortality statistics are
statutorily privileged is a question of law reviewed for correctness.  Cannon v. Salt Lake Reg. Med.
Ctr., Inc., 2005 UT App 352, ¶ 7, 121 P.3d 74. 
Preservation:  The trial court first denied the Wilsons' efforts to compel the statistics (R.
1458-1465, Ruling Re: Pl.'s Second M. to Compel Disc.), then granted an in camera review of the
Hospital's privilege log in light of Cannon (R. 6507-6510, 10/24/2008 Ruling), and then ruled the
statistics were discoverable over the Hospital's continued objection.  (R. 8605, Vol. 4, pp. 689-
692.)
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
Utah R. Evid 702, Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-25-1, et seq. (2004).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT.
This is a medical malpractice case.  A few days after his severely premature birth at 25
weeks and weighing only 2lbs, 3 ounces,  Jared Wilson ("Jared"), suffered the very type of brain
bleed to which severely premature infants are especially vulnerable, leaving him physically and
mentally handicapped.  (R. 7121, L127 (Delivery Record)2; R. 8613, Vol. 11, pp. 2192:9 -
admitted as Trial Exhibit 1.  Medical record exhibits beginning with bates label "L" are Leilani
Wilson's medical records and those beginning with bates label "J" are Jared's medical records.
Medical records in this brief are cited to as "R. 7121," followed by a specific "L" or "J" bates
label and the document's title.        
3Trial transcript citations in this brief refer to the record page (stamped on the first page
of each volume of the trial transcript), the trial volume, page and line of the testimony cited.
Selected trial transcript excerpts are contained in Part II of the Hospital's Addendum and are
identified by topic therein.    
4Jared's parents now claim they are not parties to this action.  However, they have always
listed themselves as plaintiffs and the parties to the settlement agreement with Drs. Glenn and
MacArthur are Jerome and Leilani Wilson, individually, and as parents and guardians of Jared.
(R. 8511, Settlement Agreement, ¶ 1.)  Only after suffering an adverse verdict have Jerome and
Leilani Wilson unilaterally altered the case caption and party references in pleadings to divorce
themselves as parties to the action, referring only to Jared Wilson as the plaintiff.   See Wilsons' Br.
Caption.
5The court polled the jury and all jurors responded "yes" to the question, "Was that your
verdict?" (R. 8621, Vol. 19, pp. 3901:8 - 3902:16.)  At that time, no objection or request for
further polling was made.  After the jury was dismissed and ex parte contacts made with jurors,
the court received a call from a juror who indicated that two jurors had answered "no" to the
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2195:10.)3  Plaintiffs Jerome and Leilani Wilson, on behalf of their son Jared, filed suit in March
2001 asserting medical negligence against independent physicians C. Joseph Glenn, M.D., Steven
S. MacArthur, M.D. and David Broadbent, M.D., who were the doctors involved in Mrs.
Wilson's care and Jared's delivery.  (R. 10, Compl.).  The Wilsons also sued the Hospital alleging
medical negligence and asserting respondeat superior liability based on the Hospital’s employed
medical care providers.  The Wilsons settled with Drs. Glenn, MacArthur and Broadbent before
trial.  (R. 8506-8511; R. 6452)4  The remaining claims against the Hospital were tried to the jury
October 27 through November 21, 2008.  
After three weeks of evidence, the eight person jury returned its unanimous verdict,
finding no negligence on the part of the Hospital. (R. 7116, Sp. Verdict Form.)5  The court signed
first question on the verdict form. The  Wilsons then requested that the jury be re-polled, but
their request was denied and the Judgment was signed.  (R. 7127, Pl.'s M. to Clarify Ambiguity
in Jurors Responses to Polling of Individual Jurors; R. 7634.)  Though the Wilsons raise this
matter in their Statement of the Case, it is not an issue on appeal.
6These facts are important to disposition of evidentiary issues raised on appeal because
they establish the relative weight of each evidentiary issue asserted by the Wilsons in the context
of the overwhelming evidence supporting the jury's verdict.  This should assist the Court in
determining whether each alleged error may be considered harmless as against the overall
evidence supporting the jury's verdict.
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the Judgment on January 8, 2009. (R. 7634)  The Wilsons filed their Motion for New Trial on
December 19, 2008 and raised many of the same issues argued on appeal. (R. 7154.)  Judge
Howard denied  the Motion on May 21, 2009. (R. 8564)  The Wilsons filed an Amended Notice
of Appeal on May 26, 2009. (R. 8583)
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Wilsons' statement of facts presents a version of facts which the Wilsons endeavored
to establish at trial, but which the jury rejected as unpersuasive or irrelevant.  Facts consistent
with the jury's verdict of no negligence are presented below, followed by identification of several
factual allegations contained in the Wilsons' Brief which are irrelevant to issues raised on appeal
and therefore violate Utah R. App. P. 24(k). 
A. FACTS RELEVANT TO THE JURY'S VERDICT THAT THE HOSPITAL WAS NOT
NEGLIGENT.6
Premature infants are vulnerable to brain bleeds.  Jared was born at 25 weeks, weighing
only 2 lbs, 3 ounces, and with a body trunk the size of a dollar bill. (R. 8620, Vol. 18, p. 3456:6-
10.)  Notwithstanding exceptional care from Hospital employed providers, Jared suffered a brain
bleed a few days after his birth and is now profoundly disabled.  Even with the best care,
7There is also evidence that Jared suffered cortical dysplasia, a genetic malformation of
the brain which arises early in pregnancy. See note 47 infra.
6
extremely premature babies like Jared have a host of additional risk factors that significantly
increase the risk of a brain bleed.  The average twenty-five week old baby will spend 105 days
in the Newborn Intensive Care Unit ("NICU").  (Id., p. 3475:15-18.)  One hundred percent
(100%) of twenty-five week old babies have premature lung disease.  (Id., pp. 3462:4 - 3463:5.)
Without a breathing machine, a twenty-five week old baby would die.  With a breathing machine,
the baby is at heightened risk for brain bleeds.  (Id.)  
In addition to premature lung disease, Jared suffered from a pneumothorax (an air leak
that gets trapped between the chest wall and lung making it difficult for the lung to expand)
within the first twenty-four hours of his life.  (Id., pp. 3463:13 - 3465:10.)  Air trapped inside the
chest impedes blood flow to the brain.  (Id., pp. 3464:19 - 3465:10.)  Jared was also classified in
the lowest possible category of birth weight for premature babies - "extremely low birth weight."
(Id., p. 3456:11-25.)  Extremely low birth weight is a risk factor because the baby's head is no
longer protected by the amniotic sac and the corresponding pressure that cushions the baby's
developing blood vessels in its brain.  (Id., pp. 3459:3 - 3460:6.)  Jared is also male, and males
have more complications than females in prematurity.  (Id., p. 3456:11-25.)7  In sum, one in five
babies born at twenty-five weeks suffer severe brain bleeds.  (Id., p. 3476:5-10.)  As the jury
recognized in its verdict of no negligence, Jared's disabilities occurred because of his extreme
prematurity and the increased risks associated with that unfortunate fragility - in spite of
competent care from Hospital providers.  
8Mrs. Wilson suffered three miscarriages over the years prior to becoming pregnant with
Jared. (R. 7121, L9 (Prenatal History).)
9Dr. Peter Van Dorsten, a specialist in maternal fetal medicine, testified that in 1995, a
baby was not considered viable until 24 weeks gestation. (R. 8613, Vol. 11, p. 2184:9-13.)
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1. Problems with Mrs. Wilson's Pregnancy with Jared
Mrs. Wilson, a patient of Dr. Glenn, became pregnant for the sixth time in late 1994.8
Problems became apparent early.  By December 1994, Mrs. Wilson was bleeding and an
abdominal ultrasound showed a collection of blood (hematoma) within the lining of her uterus.
(R. 7121, L25 (12/08/94 OB Ultrasound).)  On January 4, 1995, Mrs. Wilson presented to the
Hospital's Emergency Department where she received an ultrasound and was diagnosed with
premature separation of the placenta from the uterine wall (placental abruption).  (R. 7121, L30
(Emergency Department Record).)  On February 28, 1995, another  ultrasound read by Dr.
Steven Clark, a Hospital-employed  maternal fetal medicine specialist, showed an abnormal
placenta with bleeding and decreased amniotic fluid around the baby.  (R. 7121, L27 (02/28/95
Ultrasound).)  Dr. Clark was so concerned that he initiated a discussion about whether to
consider terminating the pregnancy. (Id.)  
On April 11, 1995, another maternal fetal medicine specialist, Dr. Ware Branch,
performed an ultrasound and determined that the fetus was 23 weeks gestation and that Mrs.
Wilson had virtually no amniotic fluid.  (R. 7121, L67 (04/11/95 Consultation).)9  Mrs. Wilson
reported to Dr. Branch that she had noticed an increase in the amount of bloody discharge and
suspected she may have ruptured her membranes.  (Id.)  Dr. Branch discussed with Mrs. Wilson
the implications of ruptured membranes and indicated that the overall perinatal mortality rate
10All nurses who cared for Mrs. Wilson were Level III experienced, independent
functioning nurses.  (R. 8619, Vol. 17, pp. 3351:4 - 3352:7.)  In fact, the nurses were specifically
selected by Mrs. Wilson's friend, Lisa Fullmer, R.N., who was the Labor and Delivery Clinical
Educator at the Hospital.  (Id., p. 3356:14-25.)  Nurse Fullmer lives three houses from the
Wilsons and was close to the family.  (Id., pp. 3347:16 - 3350:7.)
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was 50%, and may be as low as 30%.  (Id.)  Mrs. Wilson was also told that the baby had only a
15% to 25% chance of being born developmentally normal.  (Id.) 
2. Mrs. Wilson's April 11, 1995 Admission to the Hospital
On April 11, 1995, more than four months before her August 14, 1995 due date, Mrs. Wilson was
admitted to the Hospital by Dr. Glenn for bedrest and observation.  (R. 7121, L83 (04/11/95
Progress Note).)  Her diagnosis was "chronic abruption with bleeding."  (Id.) Dr. Glenn's plan
was to "Opt for cesarean section if infection/labor/fetal distress/or extended abruption occurs."
(Id.)  Dr. Glenn noted: "patient fully informed of risk of classical cesarean section, poor
prognosis for infant."  (Id.) 
3. Nursing Care Provided to Mrs. Wilson
 Mrs. Wilson's condition was monitored by the nursing staff and Dr. Glenn from her
admission on April 11, 1995 until the morning of April 19, 1995, when Dr. Glenn left for
vacation.10  Before leaving, Dr. Glenn arranged for physician coverage which included Drs.
Broadbent and MacArthur.  The physicians were informed of Mrs. Wilson's history, her then-
current condition and troublesome prognosis.  (R. 7121, L83-85 (04/11/95 - 04/19/95 Progress
Notes); R. 8613, Vol. 14, p. 2845:14 - 2846:12.)  The nurses were told which physician to contact
during Dr. Glenn's absence. (R. 8605, Vol. 4, p. 799:12-22.) 
During the evening of April 19, 1995, Rebecca Berg, R.N., checked Mrs. Wilson and
11Dr. Broadbent testified that it was correct for Nurse Mehew to get the CBC labs before
she called Dr. MacArthur.  (R. 8613, Vol. 11, pp. 2096:12 - 2097: 2.)  Dr. Broadbent also testified
that it wasn't important that the nurses call him, just that the doctor be notified if a critical
temperature was reached.  (Id. at pp. 2095:6 - 2096:11.)  Dr. Broadbent testified that he was only
on call until Dr. MacArthur could be reached.  (Id.)  Dr. MacArthur testified that he was not
critical at all of the nurse calling him instead of Dr. Broadbent.  (R. 8616, Vol. 14, p. 2849:18-20.)
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performed "peri care" (checking Mrs. Wilson for vaginal discharge, changing "peri pads" and
washing the peritoneum) seven times between 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.  (R. 8605, Vol. 4, pp. 796:5
- 798:6.)  She did not observe or smell anything unusual.  (Id.)  Dr. Broadbent came to the
hospital to personally evaluate Mrs. Wilson and while he was there, he interacted with the nurses,
talked with the Wilsons and read the fetal heart monitor tracing.   (R. 8605, Vol. 4, pp. 812:8 -
816:17; R. 8613, Vol. 11, p. 2076:10 - 2083:14.)  At 3:24 a.m. and 4:14 a.m., the tracing showed
two variable decelerations.  (R. 8605, Vol. 4, pp. 742:23 - 743:1, p. 748:11-15.)  Before Dr.
Broadbent left the hospital at 4:30 a.m., he re-examined the tracing and discussed blood
administration options with the Wilsons.  (R. 7121, L123 (04/19/95 Labor Flow Sheet); R. 8613,
Vol. 11, pp. 2078:16 - 2081:6.)  
At 6:00 a.m., the nurses changed shift and Mary Mehew, R.N., assumed Mrs. Wilson's
care.  Following report from Nurse Berg, Nurse Mehew took Mrs. Wilson's temperature at 6:40
a.m. and noted that it was 100.9 F.  (R. 7121, L125 (04/20/95 Labor Flow Sheet).)  She called
the Hospital laboratory to get Mrs. Wilson's Complete Blood Count ("CBC") test results and
then phoned Dr. MacArthur at 7:00 a.m.  Id.11 
Dr. MacArthur arrived around 7:30 a.m., evaluated Mrs. Wilson and looked at the fetal
heart monitor tracing.  (R. 8616, Vol. 14, pp. 2851:7 - 2852:25.)  At that time, Mrs. Wilson's
cervix was closed and Dr. MacArthur believed the baby was doing well.  (R. 8616, Vol. 14, pp.
12The membranes attached to the placenta are extracted by the obstetrician and put into
a metal pan.  They are then transferred to a lidded container and sent to the laboratory. (R. 8619,
Vol. 17, pp. 3381:19 - 3382:18.)  Jared's cord blood was also sent to the laboratory for blood
typing.  This is not the same as a cord blood gas.  (Id., pp. 3383:5 - 3384:19.)
13Apgar scores are a quantitative estimate of the condition of the infant 1 to 5 minutes
after birth, derived by assigning points to the quality of heart rate, respiratory effort, color,
muscle tone and reflexes.  A score of 8 is considered good or normal. The maximum or best
score an infant can receive is 10.  (Id., pp. 1566:3 - 1569:4.)
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2858:11 - 2859:11, pp. 2862:22  - 2864:4.)  Dr. MacArthur checked Mrs. Wilson again at 8:15 am
and found her cervix still closed with no signs of labor.  (Id., p. 2869:1-23.)  The nurses paged
Dr. MacArthur to return to Labor and Delivery when Mrs. Wilson unexpectedly started
contracting.  (Id., pp. 2870:10 - 2872:12.)  When Dr. MacArthur arrived, Mrs. Wilson was in the
c-section operating room, fully dilated and vaginal delivery was imminent.  Id. 
Baby Jared was delivered quickly and without evidence of injury at 9:33 a.m.  (Id., pp.
2872:18 - 2874:4.)  Dr. MacArthur testified that the baby experienced no problems from the
vaginal delivery. (Id., pp. 2873:6 - 2874:22.)  Mrs. Wilson's placenta and the umbilical cord were
sent to the laboratory for inspection.12  The rapidity of Mrs. Wilson's delivery, from having a closed cervix
with no signs of labor at 8:15 am to complete delivery by 9:33 am, was described not only as "unusual," but
"almost unheard of."  (R. 8620, Vol. 18, p. 3590:4-10.)
4. Jared's Condition At Birth
At birth, Jared weighed 2 lbs. and 3 ounces.  (R. 7121, L127 (Delivery Record).)  His
Apgar scores, assigned by Hospital-employed neonatologist Dr. Ronald Stoddard, were "3" at
one minute after birth, and "8" at five minutes after birth. (R. 8611, Vol. 9, pp. 1565:8 -
1568:1.)13  A cord blood gas was not ordered by any of the attending physicians because Jared
14The Wilsons expert, Barry Schifrin, M.D., testified that Jared was only 25 weeks
gestation.  (R. 8610, Vol. 8, p. 1405:4-17, pp. 1407:12 - 1408:8.)  On discharge from the NICU
Jared was again noted to be 27 weeks gestation; however, Dr. Stoddard testified that number had
been perpetuated from the earlier incorrect admission note.  (R. 8611, Vol. 9, pp. 1591:16 -
1592:18.)
15The Wilson argue that antibiotics administered to Mrs. Wilson shortly before Jared's
birth affected the culture results. However, antibiotics given 90 and 18 minutes pre-birth would
not affect culture results.  The time period is too short.  (R. 8611, Vol. 9, p. 1588:9-22.)  Further,
negative cultures of amniotic fluid taken from Jared's endotracheal tube demonstrates there was
no infection in the amniotic fluid.  (Id., pp. 1585:3 - 1586:2.)
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was alert and vigorous and had a normal 5 minute Apgar score. (Id., pp. 1577:19 - 1578:1.)
Shortly after birth, Jared was transferred to the NICU where Hospital-employed
neonatologists Drs. Stoddard and Minton cared for him.  (R. 7121, J2-4 (History & Physical).)
Jared's first blood gas, taken 12 minutes after his birth, showed no sign of asphyxia or ischemic
injury.  (R. 8611, Vol. 9, p. 1577:1-8.)  Dr. Stoddard testified there was no evidence of hypoxic-
ischemic injury at the time of birth based on the rapidity of resuscitation and initial blood
pressure.  (Id., pp. 1580:9 - 1582:2.)  Initially, Jared was assessed to be 27 weeks gestation, but
later determined to be only 25 weeks gestation based on ultrasounds, the date of Mrs. Wilson's
last menstrual period and on Jared's growth.  (Id., pp. 1591:16 - 1592:11.)14
Based on the odor present at birth, Dr. MacArthur's delivery note states that Jared was
"grossly infected" at birth.  Dr. MacArthur testified at trial that this note was an incorrect
assumption. (R. 8616, Vol.14, p. 2874:14-19, p. 2876:10-21.)  All cultures of Jared's blood and
tracheal secretions were negative for infection.  (R. 8611, Vol. 9, pp. 1584:22 - 1586:13.)  Even
though Jared's physicians watched for infection or "suspected sepsis," it was never realized.  (Id.;
R. 7121, J611 (Transfer Summary), J619 (Discharge Summary).)15 
12
Jared's physicians found no evidence that Jared was hypoxic at birth or suffered from
hypoxic or ischemic brain damage.  (R. 8611, Vol. 9, p. 1577:1-8, pp. 1580:9 - 1582:2; R. 8620,
Vol. 18, pp. 3646:23 - 3647:15.)  The Wilsons' retained expert, Dr. Ronald Gabriel, acknowleged
that Jared's first brain ultrasound, taken the day after his birth, on April 21, 1995, was normal.
(R. 8612, Vol. 10, pp. 1926:23 - 1927:8; R. 7121, J508 (04/21/95 Radiology Report).)  While
Jared’s severe prematurity made him particularly susceptible to post-birth brain bleeds, his
clinical condition at delivery was hopeful.
5. Diagnosis of Jared's Brain Bleed While in the NICU
On May 1, 1995, ten days after Jared's birth, a cranial ultrasound showed that Jared had
suffered a severe brain bleed or Grade IV intraventricular hemorrhage.  (R. 7121, J509
(05/01/95 Radiology Report).)  This type of hemorrhage can lead to serious neurological
problems. (R. 8610, Vol. 8, p. 1489:8-11.)  After months of intensive care, Jared was eventually
discharged from the Hospital on September 25, 1995.  (R. 7121, J615 (Discharge Summary).)
6. Expert Standard of Care Testimony Supporting the Jury's No
Negligence Verdict.
Peter Van Dorsten, M.D., and Kathleen Simpson, R.N., Ph.D, provided expert testimony
on the standard of care.  Dr. Van Dorsten, a specialist in maternal fetal medicine, testified that
the nursing care was entirely appropriate.  (R. 8613, Vol. 11, p. 2198:6-16.)   Specifically, he
opined that the fetal heart monitor tracing never rose to fetal risk and there was no need for
Nurse Berg to have reported any noted decelerations.  (Id., pp. 2208:25 - 2210:10.)  He further
testified it was appropriate for the nurses to call Dr. MacArthur rather than Dr. Broadbent, who
was previously on call.  (Id., pp. 2207:19 - 2208:21.)
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Dr. Simpson testified that the Hospital's nurses exceeded the standard of care.  (R. 8614,
Vol. 12, pp. 2313:21 - 2314:12.)  Dr. Simpson testified that the decelerations identified at 3:24
a.m. and 4:14 a.m. were not clinically significant, that Nurse Berg was not required to chart them,
and that the standard of care did not require that she report them to Dr. Broadbent.  (Id., pp.
2323:18 - 2324:11.)  With regard to Nurse Mehew, Dr. Simpson testified that she used correct
judgment on the morning of Jared's birth in obtaining the CBC laboratory work before calling
Dr. MacArthur, who was the "fresh" physician on-call.  (Id., pp. 2345:2 - 2347:12.)
B.  RESPONSE TO FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS RAISED BY THE WILSONS BUT
IRRELEVANT TO ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL AND SUBJECT TO MOTION TO
STRIKE UNDER RULE 24(k).
The Wilsons' 20-page statement of facts devotes several pages to allegations that have
no relevance to issues raised on appeal and which are apparently intended to bias the reader
against the Hospital and influence the outcome of this appeal by coloring the Hospital in an
unseemly light. The jury was burdened with presentation of these same scandalous issues at trial
and found the Wilsons' accusations and attacks on the integrity of the Hospital and its witnesses
to be unpersuasive and/or irrelevant distractions.  They are similarly irrelevant here.
The sections of the Wilsons' fact statement within this category include:  fact statement
section 4, which raises unsupported allegations of discovery misconduct related to Hospital
statistics (Wilsons' Br. p. 13); fact statement section 7, which accuses the Hospital of
manipulating the Wilsons' once-retained expert, Dr. John Marshall, to withdraw, and by clear
implication, bribery of Dr. Marshall's wife, Elaine Marshall (Wilsons' Br. p. 15); fact statement
section 10, which accuses the Hospital of improperly referencing genetic evidence in opening,
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at trial, and in closing (Wilsons' Br. p. 23); fact statement section 11, which speculates that the
Hospital "knowing that all of the jurors or their families had been patients at the subject
hospital" purposefully placed hospital employees who were actual care providers of jurors in the
courtroom for the purpose of intimidating jurors and accuses the Hospital's counsel, Mr.
Dahlquist, of deceitfully not disclosing to the court that he would be featured in the Deseret News
and in the LDS Church's Ensign magazine during trial so that the jury (which the Wilsons assert
was "predominately, if not entirely" members of the LDS Church (id.)) would be influenced by
Mr. Dahlquist's position in the LDS Church. (Wilsons' Br. p. 23); and fact statement section 12,
alleging that the Hospital lost or destroyed maternal membranes sent to the lab for analysis.
(Wilsons' Br. p. 24).  Each of these scandalous allegations endeavors to distract attention from
the care given in Leilani and Jared Wilson’s hospital room, and none pertains to any of the issues
raised on appeal.
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7) requires an appellant to provide a statement of facts "relevant
to the issues presented for review. . . " Utah R. App. P. 24(k) requires briefs to be "free from
burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters" and warns that "[b]riefs which are
not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the
court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer."  Utah R. App. P. 24(k).  The
Hospital contends that sections 4, 7, 10, 11 and 12 of the Wilsons' fact statement violate this rule
and requests that this Court invoke the penalties referenced in Rule 24(k).  An appropriate
Motion is filed contemporaneously with this brief.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
None of the issues raised by the Wilsons on appeal is meritorious.  The nursing modules
were properly excluded because they did not exist during the relevant time period and could not
be connected to the Hospital or the Labor & Delivery Unit.  The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in managing collateral source references by both parties consistent with the law and
the parties' stipulations, particularly where the Wilsons elicited the very testimony to which they
most strenuously object on appeal.  The trial court correctly admitted testimony by Jared's
treating phsyicians and did not abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice of Judge Stott's
Order.  The trial court's decision to exclude Dr. Hyde's proposed expert testimony as irrelevant,
unreliable and unnecessary was within its considerable discretion, especially where the court
allowed the Wilsons to explore potential bias with each individual witness.  The cumulative error
doctrine has no application because the Wilsons fail to raise a single reversible error.  And,
finally, the Hospital asserts the trial court erred in taxing costs against Jared, as opposed to his
parents, and in allowing discovery and admission at trial of the Hospital's privileged neonatal
morbidity and mortality statistics.  
ARGUMENT 
The jury’s no negligence verdict focused entirely on the care given in the Labor and
Delivery Unit where Jared was born.  In sharp contrast, the Wilsons' appeal places no attention
on the care given to the Wilsons.  Rather than challenging the events upon which the jury’s
verdict is based, the Wilsons' appeal relates only to events in litigation and trial occurring more
than ten years after the centrally dispositive facts upon which the jury verdict rests.  Indeed, only
16During discovery the Wilsons requested that the Hospital "produce all documents,
films, photos and other materials used in 1995 for training of UVRMC nurses . . . ."  (R. 1289)
In response, the Hospital produced a variety of policies, procedures and protocols as well as a
box of VCR tapes responsive to the Wilsons' request.  See Addendum, Part III, UVRMC's Supp.
Response to Plaintiffs' Request for Production of Documents.  No training modules were
produced because in 1995 the Hospital had no Labor and Delivery training modules.  (R. 8619,
Vol. 17, p. 3415:10-12, p. 3416:5-13.)  
17"For an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict."  Larsen v. Johnson, 958 P.2d 953, 958
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quotation and citation omitted).  "The more evidence supporting the
verdict, the less likely there was harmful error."  Id. 
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one of the issues raised by the Wilsons on appeal (admission of the nursing modules) relates to
the jury’s verdict of no negligence.  It is addressed in Section I.  The remaining evidentiary issues
raised by the Wilsons are addressed are in Section II.
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN EXCLUDING
THE PROPOSED NURSING MODULES BECAUSE THEY DID NOT EXIST
DURING THE RELEVANT TIME PERIOD AND COULD NOT BE
CONNECTED TO THE HOSPITAL'S LABOR & DELIVERY UNIT. 
The Wilsons raise only one issue relevant to the jury's verdict that the Hospital did not
breach the standard of care: the trial court's refusal to admit nursing modules which the Wilsons'
counsel obtained from an unrelated case, involving a different facility, and from a time period
two years after Jared's birth.16  The Wilsons unsuccessfully attempted to transport these modules
into this case as evidence.  The modules were not admitted because they did not exist at the time
of Jared's birth and could not be connected to the Hospital's Labor & Delivery unit.  The trial
court's evidentiary ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004
UT 28, ¶ 10, 94 P.3d 193.17
The Wilsons questioned two Hospital employees, Karie Minaga-Miya and Lisa Fullmer,
18The Wilsons sought to introduce the nursing modules to show that Nurse Berg
breached the standard of care by failing to report two decelerations in the early morning hours
prior to Jared's birth.   These included proposed exhibit 8 (titled Orem Community Hospital -
Module 2), proposed exhibit 9 (titled Orem Community Hospital & UVRMC - Module 3) and
proposed exhibit 36 (titled UVRMC Mother-Baby Unit - Module 6).  Proposed exhibit 10 is a
March 14, 2001 transmittal letter producing the documents in the case of Christensen v. Orem
Community Hospital.   The Wilsons first moved for the admission of proposed exhibits 8-10
during the testimony of Kari Minaga-Miya (R. 8612, Vol. 10, pp. 1799:5 - 1800:7), then moved
again for admission of proposed exhibits 8 and 9 during the testimony of the Hospital's nursing
expert Dr. Kathleen Simpson (R. 8614, Vol. 12, pp. 2418:17 - 2419: 23), and then moved the
admission of proposed exhibits 9 and 10 during the testimony of Lisa Fullmer.  (R. 8619, Vol.
17, p. 3414:10-11.)  The Wilsons never moved for the admission of proposed exhibit 36.
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concerning the modules.  Ms. Minaga-Miya, a risk-manager, could not lay any foundation and
testified that the Labor & Delivery clinical educator, Lisa Fullmer, was responsible for Labor &
Delivery training.  (R. 8612, Vol. 10, p. 1796:18-21.)  Lisa Fullmer then testified that proposed
exhibit 36 "has nothing to do with the labor and delivery unit" at Utah Valley Regional
Medical Center (R. 8619, Vol. 17, p. 3404:17-18) (emphasis added), and that it was nothing she
had ever seen before.  (Id., p. 3407:22-25) (emphasis added).  With respect to the remaining
offered modules, Ms. Fullmer testified that the Labor & Delivery modules for which she was
responsible "were not written in 1995," (id., p. 3416:18) (emphasis added), that training in
Labor & Delivery as of 1995 was conducted by training videos that had been produced to the
Wilsons (id., p. 3415:25), and that written modules at the Hospital for the 1995 time period
"don't exist."  (Id., p. 3416:21) (emphasis added).18 
The court heard argument on admission of the modules the next morning.  The
Hospital's counsel confirmed that the modules had been produced by Intermountain, but that
they had been produced "[i]n another case, for a different time period, for a different hospital."
(R. 8620, Vol. 18, p. 3448:10-11.)  The court found the modules "authentic" because they had
19The Wilsons wrongly assert that the court "seemed to acknowledge their relevance."
(Wilsons' Br. p. 15.)  In fact, the trial court correctly assessed that the modules were entirely
irrelevant because there was no foundation to connect the modules to the Labor & Delivery
Unit at the Hospital during the relevant time.  (R. 8619, Vol. 17, p. 3345:22-24.)
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been produced by Intermountain in another case.  (Id., lns. 13-14.)  However, because the
modules had no connection to the Hospital, to the Labor & Delivery Unit, or the relevant time
period, the court was correctly "unpersuaded that there's adequate foundation."  (Id., p. 3451:19-
20.)  The court stated that it recognized that "there's a low threshold for relevance, but I need
to get through foundation.  Respectfully, they are not received."  (Id., lns. 22-24) (emphasis
added).
The Wilsons argue  incorrectly on appeals that the "court conflated the legal question of
foundation with the weight of evidence."  (Wilsons' Br. p. 34.)19  In reality, the Wilsons
mistakenly conflate authenticity with relevance, and the trial court correctly recognized that
foundation is a prerequisite to relevance.  Proposed evidence may be both perfectly authentic
and entirely irrelevant as lacking the foundation needed to connect it to a fact issue in dispute
in the case.  See Utah R. Evid. 401.  The Wilsons' effort to salvage the evidence under the best
evidence rule is also unavailing because Rule 1004 simply forgives the necessity of introducing
an original document.  Utah R. Evid. 1004.  The legitimacy of the photo copies offered was not
in issue.  Rule 1004 does not permit evidence entirely lacking in foundation to be
admitted as "best evidence" in place of non-existent evidence.  Id.
The trial court correctly analyzed the foundational issues associated with the nursing
modules and was well within its broad discretion in excluding them.  It is also important to note
that, although the modules were excluded, the Wilsons were permitted to elicit testimony from
20The rule is couched in policy which favors a double recovery to the victim rather than
allowing a wrongdoer to enjoy reduced liability based upon the victim's recovery from
independent sources, and the policy of encouraging insurance by not reducing a plaintiff's award
as a result of independent insurance recovery. Green v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 59 F.3d
1029, 1032 (10th Cir. 1995). 
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their own expert, Dr. Schifrin, concerning the content of the modules (see, e.g., R. 8608, Vol. 6,
p. 1203:9-13), and were also permitted to cross-examine the Hospital's nurse expert Dr. Simpson
concerning the modules' content.  (R. 8614, Vol. 12, pp. 2419:24 - 2425:1.)  Given the abundant
evidence that the Hospital's care providers met the standard of care, and in light of the fact that
the Wilsons were allowed to fully examine witnesses on these documents, the Wilsons have not
shown how admission of the modules would have changed the jury's verdict.  Any perceived
error is therefore harmless.  Larsen, 958 P.2d at 958.    
II. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL UNRELATED TO THE
JURY'S FINDING OF NO HOSPITAL NEGLIGENCE.
All issues addressed below relate to evidentiary issues that are unrelated to the jury's
dispositive determination that the Hospital acted appropriately in caring for Jared.  
A. THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN MANAGING COLLATERAL
SOURCE EVIDENCE CONSISTENT WITH THE LAW & THE PARTIES'
STIPULATIONS.
"The collateral source rule provides that a wrongdoer is not entitled to have damages, for
which he is liable, reduced by proof that the plaintiff has received . . . indemnity from the loss
from an independent source."  Mahana v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 2004 UT 59, ¶ 37, 96 P.3d 893.20
This appeal does not involve application of the collateral source rule itself.  Rather, the Wilsons
assert reversible error because the jury was exposed to information suggesting they had received
collateral source benefits.  The policy in support of excluding collateral source evidence is that
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a jury may be less inclined to award damages if they perceive that a plaintiff may obtain a double recovery.
Phillips v. W. Co. of N. Am., 953 F.2d 923, 930 (5th Cir. 1992).
 The Court reviews the trial court's ruling on admissibility for abuse of discretion.  Eggett,
2004 UT 28, ¶ 10, 94 P.3d 193.  An evidentiary error does not require reversal unless "the
likelihood of a different outcome [is] sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict."
Larsen, 958 P.2d at 958.
1. The Wilsons Waived Any Claim of Error Relating to Collateral
Source Evidence by Stipulating in Front of the Jury to the Absence
of Out-of-Pocket Expenses, by Agreeing to the Procedure Followed
by the Court with Respect to Collateral Source References and by
Eliciting the Testimony to Which They Now Object.
Shortly before trial, the court granted the Wilsons' motion in limine "to preclude any
evidence or statements relating to the existence of health insurance or payments."  (R. 5417; Wilson's Br.
App., Ex. 2, 10/23/08 Pretrial Hr'g Tr., p. 23.) (emphasis added)  The Wilsons now contend that
the jury's finding of no negligence must be reversed based on general references to collateral
source damages evidence during trial.  This argument fails because, during the trial's first witness,
the Wilsons stipulated, in front of the jury, to the absence of out-of-pocket expenses, because the
Wilsons expressly assented to the exact structure and procedures followed during trial with
respect to collateral source references and because the Wilsons' counsel extracted from the
Wilsons' own witnesses the very testimony to which they now most strenuously object.  
This issue is controlled by three stipulations which the Wilsons proposed or to which
they expressly assented during trial.  First, during examination of the trial's first witness, Jerome
Wilson, the Wilsons offered a stipulation that they had chosen to waive all claims for out-of-
21"MR. CHRISTENSEN: And this is the problem.  The false impression has now been
created to this jury that the Wilsons . . . are on a free ride without expenses.  That is not true.
By law, Medicaid has a lien, and so does Blue Cross, and any other health insurer on this
recovery."  (R. 8605, Vol. 4, p. 657:18-23.)  "THE COURT: And that's going to be presented,
and you can - - and there may be a lien that attaches to it, but that's going to come in.  So your -
- the false impression is going to be resolved with the presence of that evidence.  MR.
CHRISTENSEN: That's fine.  If we can present it through the Blue Cross and Medicaid
people, then that's fine." (Id., p. 659:12-19.) (emphasis added).
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pocket expenses.  (R. 8605, Vol. 4, p. 621:18-20 ["We're not claiming out-of-pockets.  We
haven't kept records, and so we're not claiming them."]; Id., p. 622:13-15 ["Your Honor, we have
stipulated that we're waiving those expenses."].)  This stipulation was memorialized on the
record and in the presence of the jury.  (Id., p. 656:14-17 ["[A] stipulation was made on the
record in the presence of the jury that the plaintiff is not claiming out-of-pocket expenses."].)
Importantly, this stipulation is not limited to medical-related expenses potentially covered by
collateral sources such as health insurance, but also extends to numerous past out-of-pocket expenses not
subject to any collateral source benefit, such as home modifications, special transportation, special food
expenses, and non-medical equipment and supplies.  Second, the parties agreed to present the
jury with a stipulated amount for past medical expenses - $799,518.  (R. 8610, Vol. 8, p. 1526:4-
18; R. 8611, Vol. 9, p. 1747:21-24, p. 1749:1-2.)  Third, Wilsons' counsel also specifically agreed
within the first two days of evidence that any false impression concerning the absence of out-of-
pocket expenses resulting from the Wilsons' stipulation of no out-of-pocket expenses would be
resolved by advising the jury of liens against any judgment by Medicaid and insurers for the full
amount of past medical expenses.  (R. 8605, Vol. 4, pp. 657-59.)21  The Wilsons' counsel then
affirmed his assent to this arrangement again on the next day of trial.  (R. 8607, Vol. 5, pp. 981-
22Mr. Christensen objected to questions by  Mr. Dahlquist to the Wilsons' life care
planner concerning the absence of the Wilsons' out-of-pocket expenses for equipment and
supplies.  During a side-bar, and consistent with the prior day's agreement,  the court ruled that
Mr. Dahlquist could ask "What they would have to pay themselves, personally," to which Mr.
Christensen responded: "Then we have introduced insurance, which as I indicated yesterday,
I'm willing to do, but it's got to be the whole package."  (R. 8607, Vol. 5, p. 982:18-24.)
(emphasis added)
23The Wilsons' counsel similarly injected other specific collateral source evidence by
asking the Wilsons' own life care planner, Laura Fox, to affirm that the Wilsons had received
$8,000 per year from the Division of Services for People with Disabilities for the purpose of
paying people to come in and help with Jared.  (R. 8607, Vol. 5, p. 997:9-18.) 
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82.)22
The Wilsons now contend trial references entirely within the aegis of this stipulated
structure are reversible error, even though the Wilsons stipulated to the absence of out-of-
pocket expenses in front of the jury and then solicited from their own witnesses the most targeted and
specific statements of collateral source evidence.  For example, during the trial's first witness, and
immediately following the Wilsons' stipulation that they had no out-of-pocket expenses, the
following exchange occurred upon examination of Mr. Wilson by the Wilsons' own counsel:
 Q [Mr. Christensen]: Have the bulk of Jared's medical expenses
been paid by health insurance or Medicaid?
A [Mr. Wilson]:  Yes. 
(R. 8605, Vol. 4, p. 652:12-14) (emphasis added).  This exchange, elicited by the Wilsons' own
counsel on the first day of evidence, constitutes the most core, complete and invasive disclosure
of collateral source evidence during the entire trial.  The other disconnected piecemeal
disclosures to which the Wilsons object on appeal pale in comparison.23  The Wilsons'
stipulations concerning collateral source evidence and subsequent solicitation at trial of the very
evidence to which they now object forecloses this issue on appeal both by waiver and under the
24Under the invited error doctrine, "a party cannot take advantage of an error committed
at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error."  State v. Winfield, 2006 UT
4, ¶ 15, 128 P.3d 1171.  Appellate courts will not review any issue, even for plain error, where
"counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the [trial] court that he or she
had no objection to the [proceedings]."  Id. at ¶ 14.  Stated simply: "[Y]ou can't complain about
a result you caused."  21 Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 5039.2 (2d ed. 2009). 
25The statement of facts in the Wilsons' Brief asserts, without support, that there were
17 improper references to collateral source evidence by the Hospital.  The Wilsons' Brief
contains 12 record cites to such alleged violations.  (Wilsons' Br. pp. 17-22)  Three of the 12
references occur without objection during the trial's first witness, prior to the stipulated structure
for dealing with collateral source evidence documented during that same witness's
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doctrine of invited error.24  
The stipulated structure for dealing with collateral source evidence is manifest not only
by the Wilsons' counsel's own solicitation of the most specific collateral source evidence from
the Wilsons' own witnesses, but also by the absence of preserving objections to Mr. Dahlquist's
subsequent and less specific questions which the Wilsons now endeavor to raise on appeal.
Indeed, after this stipulated structure was reached early in the trial, the Wilsons either failed to object at
all, objected on other grounds, or raised an objection resolved by stipulation.  For example, the
Wilsons' counsel objected that the Hospital's counsel was "misconstruing the law" when Mr.
Dahlquist asked the Wilsons' life care planner if she knew that the Wilsons did not have to pay
for Jared's wheelchair (R. 8607, Vol. 5, p. 981:5-6), made a "relevance" objection when Mr.
Dahlquist asked the Wilsons' economist if he was aware of the parties' stipulation concerning
no out-of-pocket expenses (R. 8611, Vol. 9, p. 1760:7-20), and made a sustained objection of
"calls for speculation" regarding Jared's entitlement to future benefits.  (Id., p. 1767:16-19).  These
non-collateral source objections are insufficient and the Wilsons also failed to raise preserving
objections to the other allegedly improper collateral source references inventoried in their brief.25
testimony.  (R. 8605, Vol. 4, p. 659:12-19.)  Thereafter, and other than noted above, none of
the allegedly offensive statements cited in Wilsons' Brief  resulted in a collateral source objection.
(R. 8607, Vol. 5, p. 979:6-17 [no specific objection stated and no question pending]; id., pp.
981:16 - 983:10 [side bar resulting in affirmation of prior stipulation]; id., p. 985:1-4 [no
objection]; id., p. 986:10-17 [no objection]; R. 8616, Vol. 14, pp. 2782-83 [oral argument to court
outside presence of jury regarding Wilsons' motion in limine to exclude references to Medicaid and
other government programs in testimony of the Hospital life care planner John Janzen]; R. 8621,
Vol. 19, pp. 3819-20 [overruling  objection raised by Mr. Christensen in Mr. Dahlquist's
summation regarding reference to stipulation already published to the jury that the Wilsons had
no out of pocket expenses].)  Additionally, the Wilsons never moved to strike any of the
collateral source evidence references to which they object. 
26Neither does Wilsons' motion for mistrial based on admission of collateral source
evidence preserve the issue for appeal.  Raised on the 6th day of evidence (November 6, 2008),
this motion was not based on any alleged improper past admission of collateral source evidence.
Rather, to the court's astonishment, the motion was based on anticipated future questioning of Wilsons'
economic expert based upon cross-examination questions presented to the same expert in a
different case, in a different court, involving a different plaintiff, eight months earlier.  (R. 8611,
Vol. 9, p. 1617:18-22 ["THE COURT: I'm not sure I understand.  This witness has not been
presented.  You're basing a motion on what you have not yet heard, that you expect they will do?  MR.
CHRISTENSEN: This is all coming."].) (emphasis added)  Understandably, the court denied the
motion based on the grounds that it had no "record as to future testimony."  (Id., p. 1639:19-21.)
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Moreover, having stipulated in front of the jury to the absence of out-of-pocket expenses, the
Wilsons cannot credibly assign error to the Hospital's counsel's reference to a fact that the Wilsons published to
the jury by stipulation.26
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury was advised in closing argument by the Wilsons'
counsel of the parties' stipulation concerning the almost $800,000 of past medical expenses.  (R.
8621, Vol. 19, p. 3810:12-15.)  The court then instructed the jury consistent with the law and
with the parties' stipulations for dealing with collateral source evidence.  Specifically, the court
instructed that Medicaid and the Wilsons' health insurers "have liens entitling them to be
reimbursed from any award in this case" and that "no money will go the plaintiffs until such
liens are satisfied."  (Jury Instruction No. 50, R. 8621, Vol. 19, pp. 3761:22 - 3762:6) (emphasis
27Exactly consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-405(5), the jury was also told that
evidence of future government programs could be considered only to the extent they are
available irrespective of income, that Medicaid could not be considered, and that future non-
governmental programs could not be considered.  (Jury Instruction No. 51, R. 8621, Vol. 19, p.
3762:7-20.)  The jury was also told not to "speculate on or consider any other possible sources
of benefit the plaintiffs may have received."  (Jury Instruction No. 48, R. 8621, Vol. 19, p.
3761:10-17.)  The court informed the jury it would make whatever adjustments were
appropriate.  (Id.)  And finally, the court properly instructed the jury to disregard any evidence
for which an objection was sustained or which the court ordered stricken.  (Jury Instruction No.
15, R. 8621, Vol. 19, p. 3740:12-14.)  The Wilsons stipulated to each of these instructions.
(Id., pp. 3730, 3895-96.)  Since the instructions were not challenged, it is presumed they were
properly followed by the jury.  State v. Devey, 2006 UT App 219, ¶ 16, 138 P.3d 90.
28Of the 89 lines of transcript the Wilsons quote in their argument (Wilsons' Br. pp. 27-
29), only seven lines include statements made in front of the jury.  (Id., p. 27)  The Wilsons attempt to turn
attention from the events of trial and, instead, focus on post-trial motion arguments (id., p. 28-
29), which obviously did not affect the jury's verdict.  In the end, the Wilsons are left speculating
over what the jury must have thought and second-guessing the jury's motives, the jury's
thoughts, and the jury's ultimate conclusion.  (Id., p. 26)  See also City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus.,
2008 WI App 181, ¶ 70, 762 N.W.2d 757 ("Here, there is no basis in the record, other than one
that calls for speculation, to support the conclusion that the collateral source evidence affected
the jury's liability findings.").
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added).27  Thus, the trial concluded with respect to collateral source evidence exactly consistent
with the arrangement consented to by the parties and the objective of preventing the jury from perceiving
a potential double recovery was precisely met.  The Wilsons are now without basis to assert reversible
error.28 
2. The Cases Cited by Wilsons are Inapposite Because None Involves
the Appellant's Assent to the Procedures Concerning Collateral
Source Evidence, Because Collateral Source Evidence in this Case
Was Not Admitted to Prove a Substantive Issue, and Because This
Jury Was Specifically and Correctly Instructed on Collateral Source
Evidence.
The Wilsons cite six cases in support of their argument that collateral source references
during trial constitute reversible error.  Two of the cases cited, Mahana, 2004 UT 59, 96 P.3d
29 Neither Mahana nor Robinson addresses collateral source evidence issues.  Mahana,
which was a bench trial, did not deal with jury prejudice from collateral source evidence, but
simply affirmed that bond proceeds received by a plaintiff were a collateral source and properly
excluded.  Mahana,  2004 UT 59, ¶ 47.  Robinson did not relate to collateral source evidence at all,
but rather determined that reference to the defendant's insurance to cover a verdict did not affect
the adverse outcome to the defendant.  Robinson, 409 P.2d at 124-25.
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893, and Robinson v. Hreinson, 409 P.2d 121 (Utah 1965), are irrelevant because they contain no
ruling or analysis of prejudice from collateral source evidence admission.29  The four remaining
cases are all distinguishable on two fundamental grounds.  
First, and most importantly, none of the cited cases involves a circumstance where the
party alleging error offered a stipulation of no out-of-pocket expenses, assented to the procedures followed by the
court with respect to collateral source evidence, and solicited collateral source evidence from their own witnesses as
the Wilsons did here. 
Second, each of the four cases involves either the admission of collateral source evidence
to prove a substantive issue or a circumstance where the court failed to provide an appropriate
jury instruction, or both.  Tipton, Eichel, and Robinson all involve the admission of collateral source
evidence to prove a substantive issue.  Tipton v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 375 U.S. 34 (1963) (evidence
of plaintiff's receipt of Long Shoreman and Harborman's workers compensation benefits
admitted to prove plaintiff was not covered under the Jones Act as a "seaman"); Eichel v. New
York Cent. R.R. Co., 375 U.S. 253 (1963) (evidence of Railroad Act disability payments admitted
to show malingering by plaintiff and lack of motivation to return to work); Robinson v. All-Star
Delivery, Inc., 1999 UT 109, 992 P.2d 969 (evidence of disability payment from prior accident
offered to show lack of motivation to work).  In each of these cases, the evidentiary analysis
involved a Rule 403 probative-versus-prejudice analysis weighing the probative value of the
30Eichel does not mandate the exclusion of collateral source evidence.  See, e.g., Mcgrath v.
Consol. Rail Corp., 136 F.3d 838, 841 (1st Cir. 1998) ("We do not read Eichel as requiring the per
se exclusion of collateral source evidence in FELA cases.").  It merely instructs courts to
consider the prejudicial potential of collateral source evidence.  Id.   
31The Wilsons seek to overturn a jury verdict based on a few snippets of testimony from
a trial that included over 3,900 pages of transcript.  Of the 28 witnesses who testified, only three
- Jared Wilson's father, the Wilsons' life care planner, and the Wilsons' economist - raised what
the Wilsons characterize as collateral source concerns.  It is against this background that the
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collateral source evidence to prove an ultimate issue in the case, or the amount of damages.
Because of the Wilsons' stipulations, these cases are divorced from the simple concern present
in this appeal -- whether the jury was concerned about the Wilsons obtaining a double
recovery.30
In the cited cases where collateral source evidence was determined to improperly reach
the jury, the cases specifically note the absence of an appropriate jury instruction.  Tipton, 375
U.S. at 36 ("The judge did not, however, frame a cautionary instruction . . . ."); Green, 59 F.3d
at 1034 ("[T]he district court here gave no instruction to the jury limiting the use of the disability
payments . . . .").  
In contrast to all of the cited cases, the jury in the instant case was presented with a
stipulation offered by the Wilsons that there were no out-of-pocket expenses.  The jury was then
presented with a stipulation by the parties as to the amount of past-medical expenses.  And the
jury then received a specific instruction informing it that Medicaid and the Wilsons' insurers
"have liens entitling them to be reimbursed from any award in this case" and that "no money
will go the plaintiffs until such liens are satisfied."  (Jury Instruction No. 50, R. 8621, Vol.
19, pp. 3761:22 - 3762:6.) (emphasis added)  In light of these circumstances, there was no risk
that the jury would be concerned about a double recovery.31
Wilsons must demonstrate that the jury improperly hinged its no-negligence finding on
references by the Hospital to a fact stipulated to by the Wilsons: the absence of out-of-pocket
expenses. 
32The appeal of this issue as to Dr. Clark is moot.  Though the trial court initially ruled
that Dr. Clark would be excluded under Barbuto (R. 8609, Vol. 7, p. 1299:2-14), and then ruled
that Dr. Clark could testify because his care had been placed in issue, (R. 8614, Vol. 12, pp.
2293:9 - 2294:11), Dr. Clark was never called to testify.
33Wilsons' appeal on this issue as to Dr. Minton is also moot.  When the Hospital tried
to call Dr.  Minton as a fact witness, the court excluded him, finding that his treatment was not
within the scope of care placed at issue. (R. 8618, Vol. 16, p. 3154:1-16.)  The court ruled that
an employed physician could meet ex parte with counsel only where the employed doctor's care
is placed in issue. (R. 8614, Vol. 12, p. 2293:9-16.)
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B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ADMITTING
TESTIMONY FROM JARED'S TREATING PHYSICIANS.   
The Wilsons complain broadly about Barbuto violations involving Jared's treating
physicians without distinguishing between Hospital employed and non-employed physicians, and
without clearly specifying the involvement of Hospital employed treating physicians at trial.  To
be clear, Drs. Glenn, Broadbent and MacArthur were all non-employed, independent physicians
represented by separate counsel.  (Wilsons' Br. p. 39).  Each of these doctors paid settlements
to the Wilsons prior to trial.  See p. 4 supra.   Drs. Clark and Minton were Hospital employed
treating doctors, but neither was called by the Hospital to testify at trial.   Dr. Clark was never called to
testify at all.32   Dr. Minton was called by the Wilsons to testify in their case in chief.  When the
Hospital tried to call Dr. Minton in its case, the court granted the Wilsons' Motion to Strike
based upon alleged  Barbuto violations.33  The Wilsons cannot attribute error to the admission
of testimony they elicited from Dr. Minton.  This leaves only Drs. Stoddard and Boyer.  Dr.
Stoddard is a Hospital-employed treating physician.  Dr. Boyer is not.  The two are addressed
separately below.   
34Dr. Stoddard was primarily responsible for Jared's care in the Labor and Delivery suites,
as well as in the NICU.  Dr. Minton shared in responsibility for Jared's care in the NICU.  Dr.
Clark cared for Mrs. Wilson during her pregnancy. 
35The Wilsons' claims against the Hospital-employed doctors grew more specific as the
case progressed.  The Wilsons' expert, Dr. Gregory DeVore, opined that Dr. Clark was negligent
in his care and treatment of Mrs. Wilson and Jared.  (R. 1365-1368, Pl.'s Rebuttal Designation
of Expert Witness [opining on Dr. Clark's supposed failure to perform and act on antenatal
testing]; R. 8614, Vol. 12, p. 2293:9-22.)  The Wilsons accused Dr. Stoddard of a cover up,
claiming that he intentionally failed to obtain a cord blood gas, that he overinflated Jared's Apgar
scores, and purposely mis-recorded Jared's condition at birth, all to avoid a malpractice claim.
(R. 8620, Vol. 18, p. 3528:19-24; R. 8621, Vol. 19, pp. 3799:7 - 3800:23.)  Dr. Minton was
charged with making misrepresentations about the cause of Jared's condition and the
purportedly negligent care given Jared by the Hospital.  (R. 8611, Vol. 9, pp. 1699:21 - 1702:23,
p. 1710:13-23.)  
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1. Barbuto Does Not Apply to This Case With Respect to the
Hospital's Meetings with Its Employee, Dr. Stoddard. 
The Wilsons' 2001 Complaint asserted claims against the "nurses, agents and
employees of the hospital," alleging  that these employees negligently provided medical care (R.
8, ¶ 25), and alleged that "Jared Wilson suffered severe personal injuries during and around the
time of his birth."  (R. 9,  ¶ 4) (emphasis added).  As asserted, these claims  covered all the
Hospital's employees who cared for Mrs. Wilson and Jared at or near the time of Jared's birth,
including Dr. Stoddard.34  Because the Wilsons' Complaint asserted respondeat superior  liability
against the Hospital based on the care given by these employed physicians, the Hospital's
counsel was required to meet with Dr. Stoddard to be able to respond to and defend the claims
asserted against the Hospital.35
The Wilsons contend that Sorensen v. Barbuto, 2008 UT 8, 177 P.3d 614, prohibits a
hospital employer from meeting with its own employed doctors whose allegedly negligent
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care is asserted as the basis for hospital entity liability under respondeat superior.  This
position presses for a dramatic and entirely unworkable extension of Barbuto by transferring the
2008 Barbuto decision from the setting in which it arose into a new, strained and completely
different context. 
Barbuto involved a direct first party claim against a treating physician for breach of the
fiduciary duty of patient confidentiality based on the treating physician's disclosure of medical
information to the patient's third-party adversary.  Id. ¶ 5.  There was no claim of medical
malpractice against the treating physician, no claim of respondeat superior liability for the physician's
care, and neither the treating physician nor his employer had any involvement in the underlying
litigation.  In Barbuto the treating physician voluntarily disclosed confidential patient information
to a third-party without any issue being raised as to the quality of care provided by that physician.
In sharp contrast to Barbuto, this case began with broad allegations of negligent care by
the Hospital-employed doctors and nurses and a claim of respondeat superior liability against the
Hospital.  In this setting the Wilsons argue that Barbuto should be morphed to hold that
employed treating doctors accused of negligence cannot meet with legal counsel without
plaintiffs' counsel present - - even when the employed treating doctor's own care is in issue and even when the
hospital is charged with liability for that employed doctor's care.  
The Wilson’s argument is contrary to Utah R. Prof. Conduct 4.2(d), which recognizes
that employees are automatically represented where their actions may impute liability under
respondeat superior.  Utah R. Prof. Conduct 4.2(d) (2009) ("an individual is 'represented' by counsel
for the organization" if the individual's "acts or omissions in the matter may be imputed to the
organization under applicable law.")  The logical application of the Wilsons' argument portends
36In rejecting the same extension of Petrillo v. Syntax Lab., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952 (Ill. App.
1986) (Illinois' equivalent of Barbuto) that Wilsons here request of Barbuto, the Illinois Supreme
Court recognized that hospitals would have no way of determining who the charges were leveled
against and would have to risk sanctions, including the exclusion of its own fact witnesses, in
interviewing doctors and other employees about care given by both nurses and doctors. This is
counter-intuitive:
Indeed, accepting plaintiff's interpretation . . . of Petrillo . . . would lead to absurd results.
. . . [H]ospitals would face the dilemma of having to choose between ceasing to
communicate with all hospital caregivers with respect to a hospital patient's treatment,
communicating only with those caregivers the Hospital assumes were not negligent and
risk a subsequent Petrillo violation if the Hospital's assumption was incorrect, or deposing
all of the patient's hospital caregivers.  Further, if we were to accept plaintiff's view,
hospitals, which are statutorily obligated to create, maintain and protect private medical
records, would be forced to subpoena their own records in the event of litigation.  
Burger v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 759 N.E.2d 533, 555 (Ill. 2001) (emphasis added).
37Galen Health Care confronted the same issue presented here:  "how to reconcile an
employer's right to speak with its employees or agents with a patient's right to nondisclosure of
his personal medical information."  Id. at 281.  In upholding the defendants' right to speak
informally with their agents in defending against plaintiff's claims, the court reasoned:
Here, [plaintiff] is suing the various corporate entities responsible for managing the
Hospital.  The corporate entities have no knowledge in and of themselves.  They can act
only through their employees and agents and should be able to speak to those employees
to discuss a pending lawsuit.  The [defendants'] attorneys should also be able to speak
with the [defendants'] employees and agents as the corporation entities are able to
function only through them.  
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the denial of attorney-client privilege and meaningful representation to a treating physician
accused of negligent care, and the unworkable reality that the employer of a treating physician
cannot meet with its own agents to assess a claim and know how to respond.36
Other courts have considered the same issue and recognized that corporate entities must
have ex parte access to their employed physicians as agents of the Hospital to be able to assess,
respond to and defend claims.  Estate of Stephens ex rel. Clark v. Galen Health Care, Inc., 911 So. 2d
277 (Fla. App. 2005) (allowing meetings with employed treating doctors to defend wrongful death
claim where treating doctors were not sued individually)37; Morgan v. County of Cook, 625 N.E.2d
Id. at 282.
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The Wilsons argue in passing that Dr. Stoddard gave inappropriate expert testimony on causation
because he was not disclosed as an expert witness.  (Wilsons' Br. p. 41)  All of Jared's treating
physicians were identified as individuals who may offer expert opinions at trial.  (R. 718, Pl.'s
Designation of Expert Witnesses; 912-913, UVRMC's Designation of Expert Witnesses.)  The
Wilsons themselves listed Dr. Stoddard as a fact witness from whom they might elicit expert
opinions.  (R. 6663-6665, Pl.'s Designation of Trial Witnesses.)  Under Boice ex rel. Boice v. Marble,
1999 UT 71, 982 P.2d 565, parties who expressly reserve in their expert designations the right to
"call as experts any of [plaintiff's] treating physicians," may question such treating physicians in
their areas of expertise.  Id. ¶ 12.  The Wilsons cannot claim prejudice where Dr. Stoddard's
opinions were limited to issues raised in the medical record, and certainly not where they
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136, 139 (Ill. App. 1993) ("when a patient seeks to hold a hospital vicariously liable for the conduct
of a physician employee, the hospital is entitled to speak ex parte with that physician."); Alachua
Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Stewart, 649 So. 2d 357 (Fla. App. 1995) (where information possessed by
physician employees is imputed to the Hospital, the Hospital "should be able to throughly
investigate the type of care that is being provided in its hospital, especially if it is alleged that the
care was not meeting acceptable standards.")
In distinguishing Barbuto from this case, it is important to note that communications
between a defendant corporation and its employed physicians are not patient
confidentiality breaches to a third party as was the case in Barbuto.  Indeed, the corporate
entity is being held liable for the information the employed treating physician possesses and thus,
"information would flow freely within the confines of the employer/employee relationship."
Galen Health Care, 911 So. 2d at 282.  This reasoning is echoed in Burger, 759 N.E.2d at 555
(distinguishing intra-hospital communications from third-party disclosures).
The Wilsons' requested application of Barbuto to the Hospital's attorney meetings with Dr.
Stoddard38 should be rejected, along with the Wilsons' related claims of error.39
designated Dr. Stoddard just as the Hospital did and where the trial court expressly found that
they "opened the door" to causation testimony. (R. 8620, Vol. 18, pp. 3541:15 - 3542:17.)
39On appeal, the Wilsons express incredulity that the Hospital continued to meet with Dr.
Stoddard during trial.  (Wilsons' Br. p. 40)  Yet the Wilsons' counsel acknowledged on the record
that such meetings were specifically sanctioned under the trial court's ruling on the Wilsons'
motion. (R. 8618, Vol. 16, pp. 3162:17 - 3163:8.)
40Further, the Wilsons used Barbuto as both a sword and a shield.  For example, the
Wilsons themselves called Drs. Boyer, Minton, and Stoddard in their case in chief and
aggressively examined them regarding their contacts with the Hospital's counsel.  (R. 8614, Vol.
12, pp. 2450-52; R. 8611, Vol. 9, p. 1555:10-22, pp. 1710:24 - 1711:15.)  The Wilsons also
examined Dr. Boyer on the Barbuto and DeBry decisions, which were marked as exhibits during
his testimony (R. 8615, Vol. 13, pp. 2561-69), and then incorporated into the jury instructions.
(R. 8621, Vol. 19, pp. 3754-55.)  However, when the Hospital tried to call Dr. Minton, the
Wilsons successfully moved to exclude him based on  Barbuto.  (R. 8618, Vol. 16, p. 3154: 8-16.)
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2. The Wilsons Waived Any Claim of Prejudice under Barbuto with 
Respect to ALL Employed Physicians.
The Hospital's counsel represented each of the employed physicians at their depositions
years before the trial began without objection from the Wilsons.  (R. 8611, Vol. 9, p. 1627:1-12.)  When
Drs. Stoddard and Minton were deposed on June 19, 2003, Ms. Bott represented them without
objection. (Id.)  When Dr. Clark was deposed on February 13, 2004, Ms. Bott also represented him
without objection.  (Id.)  The Wilsons waited almost 5 years after the obvious and open
representation of these employed physicians until the 2008 trial to contend that the law was
violated by the Hospital's counsel's meeting with and representing these employed physicians.  The
Wilson waived any right to object by silently consenting for five years to the Hospital’s counsel’s
representation of each of the employed physicians.40 
41Dr. Boyer read or approved readings of Jared's CT and MRI scans at Primary Children's
Medical Center.  Ms. Bott met with Dr. Boyer in April 2003 after the Hospital subpoenaed
copies of Jared's CT and MRI scans.  Jared's February 3, 2003 MRI report approved by Dr.
Boyer did not mention cortical dysplasia despite the presence of that finding on earlier reports
prepared by Dr. Boyer and George W. Nixon, M.D, both of whom are pediatric
neuroradiologists at Primary Children's. (R. 7121, J3419 (5/28/96 CT Brain),  J3421 (11/11/96
CT Brain).)  Dr. Boyer amended the February 3, 2003 report to include the earlier findings.  (R.
8614, Vol. 12, p. 2459:22-24.)  He also reviewed the films with two of his colleagues, Drs. Moore
and Hedland, who also identified cortical dysplasia on the films.  (R. 8615, Vol. 13, pp. 2551:22-
24, p. 2552:1-4.)  Dr. Boyer billed $200 for his professional time in meeting with Ms. Bott.  (R.
8614, Vol. 12, p. 2456:11-16.)   
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3. The Hospital's 2003 Ex Parte Meeting with Non-Employed Treating
Physician Dr. Boyer Was Reasonably Understood as Proper at the
Time, Dr. Boyer's Addendum of His February 2003 MRI Report Was
Entirely Consistent with Prior Evaluations, the Court Allowed the
Wilsons' Counsel to Attack Dr. Boyer's Ethics for Holding the
Meeting, and the Court Properly Took Judicial Notice of Judge
Stott's April 10, 2000 Order Expressly Permitting Such Ex Parte
Meetings.
In April 2003, Dr. Boyer met with the Hospital's counsel and prepared an Addendum to
his February 2003 MRI report rendering it consistent with prior readings.  During trial and now
on appeal the Wilsons have levied a sensational attack against Dr. Boyer (a non-employed treating
physician), accusing him in front of the jury of engaging in behavior which is "unethical, illegal and
dishonest" (R. 8614, Vol. 12, p. 2450:16-20) and of being "shameless" (R. 8615, Vol. 13, p.
2559:12-15) in knowingly engaging in an illegal conspiracy to manipulate evidence for $200.  In
reality, the meeting was reasonably understood as proper when it occurred.  The Wilsons called Dr.
Boyer as a witness and then aggressively attacked Dr. Boyer as shameless and unethical, even though
his addendum was consistent with his own and other prior imaging reports.41
42This bar opinion was in effect until February 1, 2008, when it was vacated by this Court
in the Sorensen v. Barbuto decision.  2008 UT 8, ¶¶ 26-28.    
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a. Dr. Boyer's April 2003 Meeting with the Hospital's Counsel Was
Reasonably Understood as Appropriate at the Time.
The trial court correctly found that the meeting with Dr. Boyer "was not inappropriate
. . . [g]iven the authorities of the time."  (R. 8600, 10/8/08 Pretrial Hr'g, p. 148:13-15)
(emphasis added).  Lawyers and physicians in March 2000 were guided by the Utah State Bar
Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee, Op. No. 99-03 (1999), which stated: "No ethical rule
prohibits ex parte contact with plaintiff's treating physician when plaintiff's physical condition is
at issue."42  This Ethics Opinion was consistent with Utah's statute and evidentiary rule regarding
privilege.  Utah R. Evid. 506; Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(4) (2000) (renumbered § 78B-1-137).
Counsel and Dr. Boyer were entitled to rely upon this body of law in April 2003 when the subject
meeting took place.  The Utah Court of Appeals decision in Sorensen v. Barbuto, 2006 UT App 340,
143 P.3d 295, was not issued until August of 2006, more than three years after the subject meeting,
and was then affirmed on certiorari by this Court in February 2008. 
The Wilsons incorrectly contend that the March 9, 2000 Court of Appeals decision in Debry
v. Goates, 2000 UT App 58, 999 P.2d 582, distinguished on other grounds, Staley v. Jolles, 2010 UT 19,
¶¶ 26-27, --- P.3d --- (Mar. 26, 2010), is a basis to charge Dr. Boyer with bad faith and purposeful
illegal conduct.  Debry's holding that a mental health therapist should not voluntarily provide an
affidavit to a patient's adversary regarding his patient's mental state in a divorce action to influence
an alimony award did not put the Hospital's counsel or Dr. Boyer on notice that the April 2003
meeting was improper under Utah law.  To the contrary, the still-in-force specific Ethics Advisory
43The court took judicial notice of Judge  Stott's Order, which was issued on April 10,
2000, one month after Debry, in response to plaintiffs' efforts to prohibit defense counsel contact
with treating physicians.  The order states:  "To the extent that health care providers may want
to visit with the defendants or their counsel, they are permitted to do so. And, the plaintiffs or
their attorneys will do nothing to interfere with that communication."  (Id.) 
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Opinion sanctioned such a meeting, and a trial court order issued after Debry, in a case where the
Hospital's attorney in this case (Ms. Bott) was counsel, assured that ex parte communications were
expressly permitted, and even encouraged, if plaintiff's care was at issue.  (R. 8103-8105,
Order of Judge Gary D. Stott, Ex. 5 to Mem. in Opp'n to Pl.'s M. for New Trial.)43  
 The Wilsons' position that Debry covered the situation present here is defied by the Utah
Court of Appeals Barbuto decision issued in March 2006, three years after the subject meeting,
which acknowledged that Debry was only then being extended to cover ex parte  meetings with
treating physicians in the context of this case.  Sorensen, 2006 UT App 340,  ¶ 15 ("Debry did not
explicitly state that a physician's ex parte communication with the opposing side constitutes a
breach of confidentiality, its reasoning readily leads to such a conclusion.").  The April 2003
meeting was reasonably understood as appropriate under the state of the law at the time. (R. 8600,
10/8/08 Pretrial Hr'g, p. 148:13-15.)  
b. The Wilsons Called Dr. Boyer as a Witness and the Court Permitted
the Wilsons' Counsel to Attack Dr.  Boyer's Ethics Even Though
the Meeting was Justifiably Understood as Appropriate Based on the
Law at the Time and Even Though His Addendum was Consistent
with Prior Imaging Studies.
The Wilsons chose to call Dr. Boyer as part of their case in chief.  In that setting, and in spite of the
court's ruling that the April 2003 meeting "was not inappropriate . . . [g]iven the authorities
of the time" (R. 8600 (emphasis added), the trial court permitted the Wilsons' counsel to assault
44The Wilsons allege Dr. Boyer changed medical records in other cases.  With regard to
the Butterfield v. Sevier Valley Hospital case, no such amendment was made.  The case involved
brain damage caused by a perinatal stroke.  Dr. Boyer submitted an affidavit interpreting an
existing medical record.  (R. 8614, Vol. 12, pp. 2476:1 - 2477:8.)  The Wilsons' counsel in this
case had no involvement in the Butterfield case. 
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Dr. Boyer's integrity and ethics, accusing Dr. Boyer time after time on direct examination of being
"unethical, illegal and dishonest" in maliciously and dishonestly meeting in violation of the law for
$200.  (R. 8614, Vol. 12, pp. 2450:16 - 2460:8.)  Then, Wilsons' counsel opened re-direct by
accusing both Dr. Boyer and the Hospital's counsel, Ms. Bott, of being "shameless."  (R. 8615,
Vol. 13, p. 2559:12-15 ["Q: Doctor, you and Ms. Bott are shameless, aren't you? This is shameless.
You are shameless aren't you?"].)  
In response to these assaults, Dr. Boyer testified that his 2003 addendum was entirely
consistent with a November, 11, 1996 imaging report prepared years before any litigation was filed
(R. 8614, Vol. 12, pp. 2500:20 - 2501:24 ["Q. Was cortical dysplasia a new finding? A. No, it
wasn't."]), with the evaluation of another physician, Dr. Nixon, in 1996, also years before litigation
was filed (R. 8615, Vol. 13, pp. 2554:17 - 2555:1 ["Q. So how many times had cortical dysplasia
been identified or suspected prior to the . . . February 2003 report? . . . Actually, three times, Dr.
Nixon read two CTs, and mentioned it in both of his reports as I did in mine."]), and with the
consultative evaluations of Drs. Moore and Hedlund in 2005.  (R. 8615, Vol. 13, pp. 2551:22 -
2552:4.)44 
45The court took judicial notice of this order at the same time it took judicial notice of
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1-137 (waiving patient confidentiality when medical condition placed in
issue in litigation) (R. 8615, Vol. 13, p. 2520:15-17, p. 2525: 23-24) and allowed this statute to
be argued to the jury, to which the Wilsons raised no objection. 
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c. Judge Stott's April 10, 2000 Post-Debry Order Was Appropriately
Admitted to Defend the Assault on Dr. Boyer and Ms. Bott Related
to the April 2003 Meeting.
The Wilsons assert the court committed reversible error by taking judicial notice of an
order issued on April 10, 2000 by Fourth District Court Judge Gary Stott specifically finding that
ex parte meetings with treating physicians were permitted. (R. 7121, Tr. Ex. D-263 (J. Stott's
Order).)45  
"A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary
information."  Utah R. Evid. 201(d).  A trial court's decision to admit evidence under Rule 201 is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).  "[N]otice
may be taken of the record of another case" so long as the record is "offered in evidence by a
party, or so stated by the trial court, so that it will be known to [the parties] what is being relied
on."  Carter v. Carter, 563 P.2d 177, 178 (Utah 1977). 
Though the Hospital moved to preclude the Wilsons from insinuating that Dr. Boyer acted
improperly (R. 4683), the request was denied and the court allowed the Wilsons to attack Dr.
Boyer as engaging in behavior that was "unethical, illegal and dishonest."  (R. 8614, Vol. 12, p.
2450:16-20.)  Dr. Boyer explained that he agreed to meet with the Hospital's counsel because he
had been advised by a number of attorneys that when a plaintiff put his or her medical condition
at issue, the law allowed him to meet with the attorneys from both sides.  (R. 8614, Vol. 12, pp.
2494:25 - 2495:5.)  The court appropriately took judicial notice of Judge Stott's 2000 Order after
46Further, the Wilsons cannot claim error where their counsel proceeded to mark as
exhibits and discuss extensively with Dr. Boyer the facts and reasoning of the Barbuto and Debry
cases.  (R. 8615, Vol. 13, pp. 2561-69.)  The Wilsons had every opportunity to meet, explain, or
answer the Order.  Carter, 563 P.2d at 178.  The court did not abuse its discretion and the
Wilsons have failed to demonstrate how this alleged error would have altered the jury's verdict
given their own discussion of the law with Dr. Boyer.  Any error is harmless.  Larsen, 958 P.2d
at 958.
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the Wilsons' counsel argued extensively with Dr. Boyer about his understanding of the law at the
time of the 2003 meeting and accused both Dr. Boyer and Ms. Bott of being "shameless" in that
meeting.  (R. 7121, Tr. Ex. D-263 (J. Stott's Order); R. 8615, Vol. 13, pp. 2519-28).  Judge Stott's
Order was introduced not to argue the law to the jury as suggested by the Wilsons, but instead,
as the court explained when admitting the Order, because it bore on the "factual issue" of what
Dr. Boyer reasonably believed the law to be at the time.  (R. 8615, Vol. 13, p. 2527, p. 2599:10-11.)
The Order is relevant because it speaks to the reasonableness of Dr. Boyer's understanding of the law, which the
Wilsons chose to attack as baseless and in bad faith.46  
d. Jury Instruction No. 39 (the Barbuto Instruction) Was Given in 
Error.
For purposes of its cross-appeal, and only if an error is found requiring remand, the
Hospital asserts the court erred in giving part of Jury Instruction No. 39.  The last paragraph of
Jury Instruction No. 39 states: 
A physician has the duty to protect their patient's confidential information.  Since at least
March 2000, Utah law has required a physician to notify his patient before disclosing confidential records
or communications to the patient's adversary in litigation.  
(R. 8621, Vol. 19, p. 3755:8-15 (emphasis added); see also id., pp. 3730-31 (preserving exceptions
until after instructing the jury).)  The Hospital objected to the last paragraph of Instruction No.
39.  (Id., p. 3897:16-24.)  Jury instructions are reviewed for correctness, "granting the trial court
47Dr. Boyer's reading of the February 21, 2003 MRI concluded that Jared had cortical
dysplasia, a condition which develops in the first and second trimester of pregnancy, thus further
disconnecting Jared's injury from events at or near the time of his birth.  (R. 8615, Vol. 13, p.
2547:1-15.)  
48"[U]npublished decisions of the Court of Appeals issued on or after October 1, 1998,
may be cited as precedent in all courts of the State."  Utah R. App. P. 30(f).  
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no deference on its view of the law."  Billings, 918 P.2d at 466.  
 As noted above, the jury heard testimony that the Hospital's counsel met with Dr. Boyer
in April 2003.  (R. 8614, Vol. 12, p. 2450:16-20; R. 8615, Vol. 13, pp. 2559:12 - 2561:19, pp.
2591:22 - 2592:16.)  Based on Instruction 39, Plaintiffs' counsel argued in closing that the April
2003 meeting with Dr. Boyer was prohibited by Utah law.  (R. 8621, Vol. 19, pp. 3805:19 - 3806:2.)
Both the instruction and argument are incorrect as a matter of law for the reasons set forth in
Section II.B.3(a)-(c), supra.  
4. Dr. Boyer's Testimony Did Not Affect the Verdict Because the Jury
Never Reached Causation and Any Error with Respect to Dr. Boyer
was Harmless. 
The jury in this case reached a verdict of no negligence, finding that the Hospital's care
providers acted within the standard of care.  The Wilsons recognize that Dr. Boyer's testimony
related only to causation - - a question the jury never reached.47  (Wilsons' Br. p. 41)  This
issue is thus mooted by the jury's finding of no negligence.  See Alarid v. Am. Appliance Mfg., Inc.,
2002 UT App 376, 2002 WL 31600260 (refusing to reach causation in case alleging defective
design of hot water heater where jury found the product was not defective).48  As a result, any
perceived error is harmless.  See Larsen, 958 P.2d at 958. 
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C. THE COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED PART OF DR. HYDE'S TESTIMONY
BECAUSE HE WAS NOT QUALIFIED UNDER RULE 702 AND BECAUSE HIS
OPINIONS WERE IRRELEVANT, UNNECESSARY AND CUMULATIVE.
The trial court "is allowed considerable latitude of discretion in the admissibility of expert
testimony, and in the absence of a clear showing of abuse, this court will not reverse."  Stevensen
v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 347 (Utah 1996).  The Wilsons designated Dr. Hyde as a purported
expert to testify about Intermountain's market share for the purpose of generically suggesting
that all defense witnesses were incapable of testifying truthfully because Intermountain is
institutionally corrupt and exercises dominating control over everyone associated with it.  The
court correctly excluded this "expert" testimony on the grounds that Dr. Hyde was not qualified
under Utah R. Evid. 702, and then permitted the Wilsons the opportunity to show individual
grounds for bias with each individual witness based on their own particular circumstances.
1. The Court Properly Exercised Its Gatekeeper Function to Exclude
Part of Dr. Hyde's Testimony Under Rule 702.
Dr. Hyde testified at trial.  (R. 8613, Vol. 11, pp. 2121 - 2170.)  However, with regard to
a portion of Dr. Hyde's proposed testimony, the court properly exercised its assigned
"gatekeeper responsibility to screen out unreliable expert testimony."  Utah R. Evid. 702 advisory
committee's note (requiring court to "confront the proposed expert testimony with rational
skepticism."). Specifically, Dr. Hyde lacked foundation to opine as to Intermountain's alleged
influence over witnesses and his theories offered no scientific reliability. 
Dr. Hyde testified in deposition that "I had no occasion prior to being retained in this
case to have studied Intermountain Health Care."  (R. 5315, UVRMC's Mem. Supp. M. Strike,
R. 5288:22-24, Ex. A to Mem.)  When questioned about his background, Dr. Hyde admitted
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"there are no specific issues that I would point to as being analogous between former positions
and circumstances of this case . . . ."  (Id., R. 5309, R. 5275:4-8.)  When questioned whether he
was qualified to testify regarding a hospital misusing its power to intimidate witnesses, he said,
"Do I know that this doctor or that doctor has been intimidated by any action of the
defendants?  No, I'm not – I'm not qualified to, nor have I looked into that."  (Id., R.
5249:3-4) (emphasis added). 
Dr. Hyde's proposed opinions are also not scientifically reliable or reliably applied to the
facts.  Utah R. Evid. 702(b).  He never researched Intermountain before being retained to testify
in this case.  (Id., R. 5315, R. 5288:22-24.)  Most of Dr. Hyde's information came from the
Wilsons' counsel (id., R. 5285:22 - R. 5283:11), and based on this, Hyde opines: "[Intermountain]
is known to me as the largest and most powerful hospital network, not only in this country but
possibly in the world."  (Id., R. 5310, R. 5290:21-24.)  These bold opinions were uniquely
developed for this case, were not based on independent research, and are incapable of peer
review.  Thus, Dr. Hyde was properly excluded under Rule 702.  Minasian v. Standard Chartered
Bank, PLC, 109 F.3d 1212, 1216 (7th Cir. 1997) (exclusion proper where opinions "full of
vigorous assertion . . . carefully tailored to support plaintiffs' position but devoid of analysis.").
2. Rather than Allowing Dr. Hyde's Collateral Side-Show, the Court
Permitted the Wilsons to Attack the Bias of Each Witness
Individually. 
The court correctly excluded that part of Dr. Hyde's testimony that involved "a large
collateral discussion which is not directly focused on the specific medical care of the Wilsons,
but on the nature and character of the hospital defendant."  (R. 8603, 10/28/08 Pretrial Hr'g,
p. 317:21-24.)  A detour into Intermountain's tax exempt status, its community relations, its
49The trial court has considerable discretion in determining relevance and in weighing Dr.
Hyde's peripheral probative value against time constraints and cumulative evidence concerns.
Larsen, 958 P.2d at 956 (relevance); State v. Vigil, 922 P.2d 15, 27-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (403
ruling must be "beyond the limits of reasonability.").  Dr. Hyde was also properly excluded
under Rules 402 and 403.   
50During his examination of Dr. Minton, Wilsons' counsel was allowed to ask Dr. Minton
if he was paid nearly $800,000 from Intermountain in 2002, and if Intermountain could
terminate Dr. Minton without cause if it gives him 90 days notice.  (R. 8611, Vol. 9, pp. 1689:14
- 1693:7.) 
51Wilsons' counsel was allowed to challenge Dr. Boyer's bias by asserting that 95% of his
business comes through Primary Children's Medical Center.  (R. 8614, Vol. 12, pp. 2449:6 -
2450:10.)
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market concentration, and its relations with doctors and nurses in the community was designed
only to prejudice the jury against an institution on matters irrelevant to the care provided by the
Hospital in this case.49  Rather than permitting Dr. Hyde's unqualified generalizations, the trial
court allowed the Wilsons to attack bias of individual witnesses based on their particular
financial or other ties to Intermountain. (See, e.g., R. 8611, Vol. 9, pp. 1689:14 - 1693:7 [Dr.
Minton];50 R. 8614, Vol. 12, pp. 2449:6 - 2450:4 [Dr. Boyer].)51  The Wilsons' counsel also
offered his view of Intermountain's market power and its impact on witnesses in closing
argument.  (R. 8621, Vol. 19, pp. 3771:1 - 3774:4.) 
The trial court's discretion in excluding Dr. Hyde under Rule 702 and allowing the
Wilsons to probe bias of individual witnesses was correctly exercised.
III. THE CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE IS INAPPLICABLE.
Reversal is not warranted under the cumulative error doctrine unless "the cumulative
effect of the several errors undermines [this Court's] confidence . . . that a fair trial was held."
Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Air Quality Bd., 2009 UT 76, ¶ 54, 644 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (errors
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alleged did not go to fairness of trial and therefore did not implicate cumulative error doctrine);
State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ¶ 25, 999 P.2d 7 (claimed errors either not errors or so minor as to
result in no harm and therefore no relief under cumulative error doctrine).  The Wilsons have
raised only a single assertion of error related to the jury's verdict of no negligence (exclusion of
nurse modules). As argued above, the modules were correctly excluded.  The other evidentiary
issues raised on appeal neither relate to the jury's verdict, nor are they meritorious.  Even if one
or more of these alleged errors are recognized, none determined the outcome and are harmless
when considered in context.  Utah R. Civ. P. 61; Utah R. Evid. 103(a).  The cumulative error
doctrine is therefore inapplicable.   
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN TAXING COSTS AGAINST JARED, AS OPPOSED
TO HIS PARENTS, AND COSTS FOR TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS SHOULD
NOW BE AWARDED.
A. COSTS SHOULD BE TAXED AGAINST THE WILSONS UNDER RULE 54(D).
For purposes of its cross appeal, the Hospital asserts the trial court erred in taxing costs
against Jared, as opposed to his parents.  (R. 8452-8458, Ruling Re: Def. IHC's M. for Costs; R.
8499-8501, Ruling Re: Pl.'s Obj. to Prop. Order Re: Costs and Req. for Clarification; R. 8502-
8505, Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part UVRMC's Verified Mem. of Costs; R. 8594-
8598, Ruling Re: Pl.'s Obj. to Order and Req. for Clarification.)  Whether costs may be assessed
against parents who have initiated lawsuits on behalf of their minor children is a question of law,
reviewed for correctness. Madsen, 2008 UT 69, ¶ 19.
Rule 54(d) provides that "costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party."  The
rule contains no exceptions precluding cost awards against guardians ad litem.  Some states have
enacted statutes to address this issue.  See, e.g., Peterson v. Skiles, 113 N.W.2d 628, 637 (Neb. 1962)
52This is not a case where the court appointed a disinterested third-party to represent
Jared's interests.  In such a case, where the guardian ad litem is subject to the court's control, the
assessment of costs could be inequitable and could discourage disinterested parties from
assisting the courts.  See U.S. Fid. & Guar., 55 S.W.2d at 639 ("[A] guardian ad litem is not
chargeable personally with the costs of the suit taxed against his ward . . . because his connection
with the case is imposed by order of the court . . . .")  In contrast, Jared's parents brought and
vigorously pursued suit, only attempting to minimize their role once the Hospital sought its
mandatory costs.  At trial, the Wilsons sought to recover "past medical expenses they have
incurred on Jared Wilson's behalf [and] [a]ny future medical expenses they will incur on his
behalf." (R. 8602, Vol. 1, p. 292:5-9 (Jury Instruction No. 1).) (emphasis added)  Those damages
can only be recovered in Utah by the minor plaintiff's parents, not the minor plaintiff or the
guardian ad litem.  See Ostertag v. La Mont, 339 P.2d 1022, 1026 (Utah 1959).  Finally, in settlement
with other defendants below, the Wilsons settled "individually and as parents and guardians
of Jared Wilson, a minor . . . ."  (R. 8506-8511, Settlement Agreement) (emphasis added).  The
Wilsons clearly had something to gain by bringing this lawsuit and, like every other plaintiff
under Rule 54(d), the Wilsons had something to lose by bringing this lawsuit.         
45
(Nebraska statute holding next friend liable for costs); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Henderson, 55
S.W.2d 639, 639 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (same under Texas statute).  Utah has not. 
Where no statutory enactment immunizes a guardian ad litem from liability for costs, a
guardian ad litem that is not subject to the control of the court should be subject to costs just as
any other litigant who institutes an unsuccessful lawsuit.52  After all: "He it is who brings the suit
into being.  Without him, it would not exist.  Without him, the defendant would not be put to
costs."  Fisher v. Bell, 63 S.E. 620, 620 (W. Va. 1909).  Indeed, "[a]ny other rule would subject
parties to the mercy of immature infants and irresponsible persons instituting suits on their
behalf."  Id. 
Rule 54(d) allows prevailing defendants like the Hospital to recoup a small fraction of
their litigation expenses from the parties responsible for initiating and pursuing unsuccessful
lawsuits.  It is improper to allow parents who instigate lawsuits on behalf of their minor children,
to circumvent the proscriptions of Rule 54(d) solely upon the semantics in the caption of their
53As mentioned in note 1 supra, though it is not identified in the Wilsons' Statement of
Issues, the Wilsons contend the court erred in awarding costs because the Hospital's cost
application was untimely.  (Wilsons' Br. p. 46)  Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2) requires a party claiming
costs to serve and file a memorandum of costs "within five days after the entry of judgment."
The Hospital's Memorandum of Costs was served and filed on December 26, 2008.  (R. 7588-
7592)  Judgment was not entered until January 8, 2009.  (R. 7632-7634)  The Hospital's cost
application was early and therefore timely.  The Wilsons incorrectly contend that the Order
entered on December 9, 2008 is really a "judgment" and should therefore have triggered the five-
day deadline.  (Wilsons' Br. p. 46)  Rule 54 refers expressly to "entry of judgment," not "order."
"Orders" and "judgments" are distinct legal animals, governed by distinct rules.  Utah R. Civ. P.
7, 54 and 58A.  Different procedures must be followed to obtain entry of orders and judgments.
Id.  And orders and judgments have different effects and consequences when entered.  Utah R.
Civ. P. 7 and 58A.  The two are not synonymous. The Wilsons cite no authority for their
position and the trial court correctly rejected the Wilsons' argument. (R. 8452-8458)
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complaint and their claims for relief.  Unsuccessful plaintiffs should not escape their cost
obligations based on artful pleading.53 
B. THE HOSPITAL CAN RECOVER THE COSTS FOR TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS USED
ON APPEAL.  
  The Hospital sought the costs of trial transcripts, upon which the Wilsons, the Hospital
and the court relied during trial.  (R. 7588-7592)  The court acknowledged the convenience of
the daily transcripts - both to parties and to the court - but denied costs for the transcripts
because the parties had the "option of utilizing the audio recording system."  (R. 8454)  Plaintiffs
have resurrected this issue by appealing the underlying judgment.  A litigant who pays for daily
trial transcripts is entitled to recover its costs for those transcripts as a cost on appeal where the
non-prevailing party in the trial court uses the transcripts on appeal. Highland Constr. Co. v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1052 (Utah 1984); Utah R. App. P. 34(c).
54The trial court first denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel and ruled the statistics were
privileged.  (R. 1458-1465)  The court subsequently granted Plaintiffs' Motion for
Reconsideration, based upon Cannon, and ordered an in camera review of the Hospital's privilege
log.  (R. 6507-6510, 10/24/2008 Ruling.)  On October 30, 2008, the court ruled, over the
Hospital's continued objection, the statistics were discoverable.  (R. 8605, Vol. 4, pp. 689:24  -
692:16.)       
55The Cannon court defined the interests the privilege is designed to protect: "The
Hospital has a legitimate interest in protecting reports under the care review privilege in order
to ensure an open exchange of accurate information between personnel and administrators in
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V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE DISCOVERY AND
ADMISSION OF THE HOSPITAL'S PRIVILEGED NEONATAL
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY STATISTICS.
For purposes of its cross appeal, and raised only if an error is found requiring remand,
the Hospital asserts that the court erred in allowing Plaintiffs to discover and introduce the
Hospital's neonatal morbidity and mortality statistics.  Plaintiffs used and referred to the statistics
throughout trial and in closing argument.  (See, e.g., R. 8608, Vol. 6, pp. 1215:18 - 1220:22; R.
8610, Vol. 8, pp. 1476-1505; R. 8621, Vol. 19, pp. 3884:24 - 3885:2.)  Whether the statistics are
statutorily privileged is a question of law reviewed for correctness.  Cannon, 2005 UT App 352,
¶ 7.54 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-1 (2004) provides that data relating to the condition and
treatment of any person may be gathered for the "study and advancing [of] medical research,
with the purpose of reducing the incidence of disease, morbidity or mortality."  Under Utah
Code Ann. § 26-25-3,
all information, interviews, reports, statements memoranda, or other data furnished by
reason of [Chapter 25], and any findings or conclusions resulting from those studies are
privileged communications and are not subject to discovery, use or receipt in evidence in any legal
proceeding of any kind or character.
(emphasis added)  Production of privileged material is a criminal offense.  Id. § 26-25-5(1).55  
order to improve the effectiveness of studies, evaluations, and any measures implemented to
improve hospitals and the quality of the health care they provide.  That interest is aligned with
the very purpose behind the care review privilege to improve medical care by allowing health-
care personnel to reduce morbidity or mortality and to provide information to evaluate and
improve hospital health care.'" Cannon, 2005 UT App 352, ¶ 22 (internal citations omitted).
56Cannon does not alter this conclusion.  It stands for the proposition that a court must
have an adequate evidentiary basis upon which to make the privilege determination.  Cannon,
2005 UT App 352, ¶¶ 18-21.  In Cannon, the trial court found that documents were privileged
solely on the basis of an affidavit that tracked the statutory language in conclusory terms.  It did
not conduct an in camera review.  The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, ordering the
trial court to review the documents in camera.  Id.  Cannon is distinguishable.  Here, the trial court
had deposition testimony of doctors, elicited under cross-examination, that specifically identified
the categories of information collected and the purposes to be served by the data.  Beyond that,
the trial court conducted an in camera review.  That is not the error ascribed.  Here the court
erred in concluding the documents were not privileged and in allowing their admission once the
review was complete.             
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Dr. Minton testified the statistics are gathered to "figure out what we're doing right.  We
use those as peer review, quality improvement, quality assurance, . . . in order to give feedback
to physicians and to staff."  (R. 1253: 21-24, Exhibit C to UVRMC's Mem. Opp'n to Pl.'s Second
M. to Compel Disc.)  Dr. Stoddard testified the statistics are used to "gauge our performance
with those of other hospitals and find out if there is significant variation."  (Id., R. 1257:10-12.)
These statistics are compiled and provided to an in-house staff committee for use in medical
research to reduce the incidence of disease, morbidity, and mortality.  It is precisely the sort of
information contemplated and protected by Utah Code Ann. § 26-25-1(1), (3).  The trial court
erred in ruling the statistics were not privileged and admissible.56  
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion and argument, the Wilsons' appeal should be denied
and the verdict of the jury affirmed.  The trial court's discretion was not abused with respect to
any of the evidentiary issues challenged.  Moreover, the Wilsons' appeal raises no challenge with respect
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to the sufficiency of evidence to support the jury's verdict of no negligence, thereby conceding the sufficiency
of such evidence to support the verdict.
With respect to its cross-appeal, the Hospital also requests that this Court direct that
costs are properly taxed against Jerome and Leilani Wilson as plaintiffs, including an award of
costs associated with trial transcripts.
The Wilsons' Brief requests not only that the jury's verdict be vacated, but also asks this
Court to extend extraordinary affirmative relief on remand in the form of sanctions, including
striking the Hospital's causation defense, the preclusion of the Hospital physician-employee
witnesses, disqualification of the Hospital's counsel and imposition of costs associated with the
need for a new trial based on evidentiary errors by the trial court.  These extreme requests for
affirmative relieve are unprecedented and unwarranted.  The affirmative relief requested should
be entirely beyond consideration in any circumstance where trial court evidentiary rulings require
a new trial, and especially in the context where an appellant has invited and contributed to the
errors alleged, such as with respect to the introduction of collateral source evidence, and where
the trial court has both found no misconduct on the part of and ruled in favor of the appellee.
Punishing a party for erroneous trial court rulings should not be considered, and the Wilsons'
invitation to treat the parties as unequal under the law should be disregarded.  (Wilsons' Br. p.
47 ¶(d) (suggesting only institutional parties be subject to requested sanctions).)
In the event any issue raised on appeal requires remand, the Hospital requests that this
Court's order (1) specifically affirm the propriety of testimony from Jared's treating physicians
who are or were employees of the Hospital, including Drs. Clark, Stoddard and Minton and the
propriety of such employed-physicians ex parte meetings with counsel for the Hospital; (2) direct
thewithdrawal ofJury Instruction 39 and prohibition of any similar insmction; and (3) rule that 
the Hospital's neonatal and morbidty and mortality statistics are within the aegis of Utah Code 
Ann § 26-25-1. 
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